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For Germany, we analyse the (relative) effects of participation in several active labour market 
programmes on the employment prospects of participants. First, our results show that 
different matching algorithms result in different severe problems of common support. Second, 
we obtain favourable effects of participation in training programmes, which is not true for job 
creation schemes. Third, while lock-in effects are smaller for shorter programmes, long 
retraining shows mainly positive effects compared to shorter training at the end of the 
observation period. Fourth, participants in job creation schemes are too different from 
participants in training programmes to conduct a reliable comparison. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
During the last years, the evaluation of active labour market programmes has become a central 
research topic in many countries: Policy and administration have increasingly been interested in 
topics such as programme effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, the development of 
comprehensive merged data sets – covering times of unemployment, programme participation 
and  employment  –  laid  the  groundwork  for  further  research.  Although  methodological  ad-
vancements (Imbens, 1999; Lechner, 2001) have extended the often used framework for the 
estimation of causal treatment effects (Rubin, 1974; Heckman et al., 1999) to pairwise pro-
gramme comparisons, most evaluation studies have analysed the effects of being or not being in 
a particular programme.  
For Germany, our study analyses the relative effectiveness of participation in different variants 
of further vocational training, short-training programmes and job creation schemes. Average 
programme effects on participants are estimated by comparing the group of those joining a par-
ticular programme during March 2003 with groups of similar persons that did enter either no 
programme or one of the other programmes during this month. Outcome variables are cumu-
lated days spent in regular employment during the 3.5 years after programme start as well as the 
share in regular employment at the end of the observation period. To choose adequate compari-
son groups we apply propensity score matching; the data used are provided by the TrEffeR-
database of the German Public Employment Service.  
Our paper complements the existing literature mainly by two aspects: First, the knowledge on 
the relative effectiveness of participation in different programmes is still sparse for Germany. 
The results of the few studies available differ partly, we analyse more recent programme en-
tries, and we distinguish between two very different variants of short training programmes. 
Second, we pay particular attention to the problem of common support that arises when estimat-  2 
ing relative programme effectiveness (Lechner 2000) and conclude that not all programme vari-
ants might be compared. 
Section II provides a brief survey on the programmes investigated, while Section III sketches 
previous research results. Section IV depicts the evaluation approach. Section V discusses the 
applied method, paying particular attention to the common support problem. Section VI then 
informs about data and variables used in the empirical analysis. Our empirical findings are de-
scribed in section VII. We draw some conclusions in Section VIII. 
II  PROGRAMME FEATURES 
Unemployment in Germany had been rising for many years. As a consequence, major labour 
market reforms were enacted from 2003 to 2005. New instruments of active labour market pol-
icy were implemented, existing programmes were modified, the German Public Employment 
Service was reorganised, and former unemployment assistance and social assistance were con-
solidated into a new means-tested basic social care for needy unemployed job-seekers. Unem-
ployment reached its maximum with on average 4.9 million unemployed persons in 2005. Since 
2005 unemployment has declined substantially, to (seasonally adjusted) 3.2 million registered 
unemployed persons in August 2008. Active labour market programmes have the main objec-
tive to improve the employment prospects of participants and to avoid or shorten periods of 
unemployment.  Table  1  shows  entries  into  the  most  important  German  labour  market  pro-
grammes from 2000 to 2006 (see Bernhard et al., 2008, for details).  
Our analysis is restricted to three of the largest programmes: We analyse variants of further 
vocational training, short training programmes and job creation schemes. Programme features 
as well as evaluation results will be described in the following. Further important programmes 
are in particular wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and contracting-out to private agencies.    3 
Table 1   Entries in important German labour market programmes  
during 2000-2006 (in 1000)  
 Programme  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Further vocational training (Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung)  523  442  455  255  185  132  247 
Short training (Trainingsmaßnahmen)  485  551  865  1064  1188  894  978 
Job creation scheme I (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM)  318  246  215  179  161  80  80 
Job creation scheme II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten)  -  -  -  -  -  630  742 
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschuss)  152  127  188  183  157  134  217 
Start-up subsidy I (Überbrückungsgeld)  93  96  125  159  183  157  108 
Start-up subsidy II (Existenzgründungszuschuss)  -  -  -  95  168  91  43 
Start-up subsidy III (Gründungszuschuss)  -  -  -  -  -  -  34 
Contracting-out to private agencies (Beauftragung privater Dritter)*  -  -  -  -  635  426  301 
*) Numbers are available since 2004, while different variants started already in 1998 (contracting-out 
subtasks of placement) and 2002 (contracting-out all placement services).  
Source: Statistics Department of the German Public Employment Service (Data-Warehouse).  
For a long time further vocational training (Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung, FbW) has 
been one of the most important German labour market programmes. During the first half of this 
decade, the number of entries decreased (as well as the average programme duration); but the 
number of entries increased again in 2006. Further vocational training updates and extends 
professional  qualifications.  It  encompasses  a  range  of  different  treatments,  which  can  be 
broadly classified in qualification programmes, training within “practice firms” (which offer 
practical occupational training, but are no “real” companies) and long retraining programmes. 
The latter might be granted to persons without completed vocational training or to unemployed 
who did not practice a corresponding job for the last four years. Direct training costs for further 
vocational training programmes are paid by the Public Employment Service, and participants 
receive a subsistence allowance that usually equals the unemployment compensation. Since 
2003 access to further training programmes is granted through training vouchers that specify 
training target, programme duration, regional scope and period of validity. A caseworker issues 
a training voucher to a potential participant, who has then to find a training provider offering an 
adequate  course,  who  is  also  willing  to  sign  in  the  holder  of  the  voucher.  Kruppe  (2008) 
showed that hard-to-place unemployed a) receive a voucher less often and b) make use of the 
voucher less often.   4 
Since 2001, short training programmes (Trainingsmaßnahmen, TM) are the programme with the 
highest number of programme entries. Programme duration is, however, short and varies from 
two to eight weeks. Short training programmes have a number of different objectives: They 
could improve knowledge and skills, test the occupational aptitude of the employee, check 
whether unemployed are suited for further longer-term measures, support job-search by job 
application  training,  or  verify  an  employee's  availability  and  willingness  to  work.  Training 
measures are conducted by providers (classroom) or placement in a firm (firm-internal). Similar 
to further vocational training programmes, direct programme costs are paid by the Public Em-
ployment Service, while participants continue to receive unemployment compensation. Partici-
pation in a short firm-external training programme will be often suggested by the caseworker 
and then conducted by providers (Kurtz 2003). Short firm-internal training requires additionally 
that a firm is willing to offer the training opportunity to a potential participant. Employers 
might use the training to test the productivity of the unemployed person without incurring any 
wage costs; this raises also the danger of deadweight losses if an employer would have hired 
the unemployed in question anyway. 
Job creation programmes had been an important instrument at the beginning of this decade, but 
then lost importance until 2004. Our analysis will focus on the most important traditional vari-
ant of job creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, ABM) that are mostly conducted 
in the public and non-commercial sector. They should provide the last chance to stabilise and 
qualify unemployed persons for later re-integration into regular employment. The tasks carried 
out during participation have to be of “additional” nature (they would not be executed without 
the subsidy) and of public interest. Until 2004, grants paid for job creation schemes were based 
upon an “allowable” remuneration and covered part of the costs. Currently, a lump sum pay-
ment is granted, the amount of which varies with the qualification required. The regular dura-
tion of participation in a job creation schemes is limited to 12 months, while exemptions are 
possible. A further variant (Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen, SAM) had been in place from 2003   5 
to  2004,  with  the  purpose  to  maintain  or  improve  regional  infrastructure  and  environment 
whereas providers received a monthly lump sum payment for participants. The regular pro-
gramme duration was 36 months, but could even be prolonged. In 2005, a new a variant of job 
creation schemes was introduced for the new group of needy job seekers receiving basic social 
care (Arbeitsgelegenheiten or Ein-Euro-Jobs), which now plays a major role. This programme 
provides only a modest additional reimbursement for work.  
III  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A considerable number of papers investigated the effectiveness of further vocational training 
programmes in Germany, comparing participants with comparable non-participants. Lechner et 
al. (2005; 2007), Fitzenberger et al. (2006) and Fitzenberger and Völter (2007) analysed the 
long-run effects up to seven years after programme entry, focusing mainly on unemployment 
entries during 1993/94. In the long run, they generally found positive effects of further voca-
tional training. However, because programme effects are rather weak, it may take some time 
until the estimated effect turns positive. For more recent programme entries during the years 
2000 to 2002 the evidence is mixed: Wunsch and Lechner (2008) restricted their sample to 
West Germany and individuals aged 25 and 49. Their results showed that further vocational 
training – and other programmes – had mostly negative or insignificant effects on employment 
rates of participants 30 months after programme start. Biewen et al. (2007) found positive ef-
fects on employment rates of participants of age 25 to 53 for programmes of short and medium 
duration in West Germany (but not in East Germany) and particular groups of unemployed. 
Rinne et al. (2007) obtained – two years after programme entry – positive effects of participa-
tion in medium length programmes on the employment probabilities of participants in all sub-
groups investigated, covering participants of age 17 to 65. Hujer et al. (2006a) applied duration 
analysis to East German data from the years 1999 to 2002. Their main result is that participa-  6 
tion in further vocational training prolonged unemployment duration during the period investi-
gated. 
For short training programmes, Biewen et al. (2007) found mostly positive effects of short 
training-programs, while Wunsch and Lechner (2008) – who separately analysed short com-
bined measures, jobseeker assessment and short training for minor adjustment of skills – did 
not. The duration analysis of Hujer et al. (2006b) showed that the risk of entering employment 
is significantly higher for individuals participating in a short-training programme. Wolff and 
Jozwiak (2007) distinguished between short classroom training and short training within firms 
for individuals and investigated the effect on the employment prospects of needy job-seekers, 
who receive the new basic social care. They showed that both variants had positive effects, 
which are much larger for short training within firms. Büttner (2008) used data from a social 
experiment on short-training programmes to test the availability of the unemployed. His main 
result was that it is the notification of treatment rather than participation that has an effect on 
leaving unemployment. 
Entries into job creation schemes – with an average duration of 9 to 11 months – have been 
investigated by Caliendo et al. (2006; 2008a; 2008b) and Hujer and Thomsen (2006). The au-
thors applied statistical matching methods; they imposed no age restrictions, but estimated het-
erogeneous effects for groups of participants. Three years after programme entry (in February 
2000) these effects turned out to be mostly negative or insignificant. Exceptions were long-term 
unemployed, highly qualified men and older women in West Germany. Wunsch and Lechner 
(2008) also obtained negative effects of participation in this programme on the employment 
prospects of participants. Hujer and Zeiss (2006) showed for East Germany that participation in 
job creation schemes increases individual unemployment duration of participants, using the 
timing-of-events method. Recent results on the new “One-Euro-Jobs” (Hohmeyer and Wolff 
2007), introduced in 2005, highlighted the effect heterogeneity of this programme. The authors   7 
found slightly positive effects in particular for participants from West Germany and individuals 
out of regular employment for a longer time period.  
What are the results of cross-programme comparisons for Germany? First evidence was pre-
sented by Lechner et al. (2005), who compared participants in practice firms, short and long 
programmes providing professional skills as well as retraining, for programmes starting during 
1994/95. In the long run, seven years after programme start, they obtained few significant dif-
ferences between programme effects (Table 6.2, 46). Using more recent data, Biewen et al. 
(2007) conducted pairwise evaluations of several further vocational training programmes and 
short training programmes. They observed labour market outcomes of participants for a period 
of 2 to 2.5 years after treatment start. A main result is that participants in short training pro-
grammes would not have improved their latter employment rates by attending longer classroom 
or practical training. Longer classroom training showed no advantage for the treated, compared 
to the other programme variants. However, practical further training was often more effective 
for participants than another training variant would have been. Wunsch and Lechner (2008) 
compared an even wider range of programmes, distinguishing three kinds of short training pro-
grammes, four variants of further vocational training, and public employment schemes. Their 
pairwise comparisons (Table 7, 169) showed at a = 0.05 nearly no significant effect of partici-
pation in one programme – compared to participation in another programme – on the employ-
ment rates 2.5 years after treatment start. Exceptions were long retraining programmes that had 
a significant negative effect on employment rates of participants compared to most other pro-
grammes. Kluve et al. (2007) used a different technique to compare the effects of training of 
different lengths, restricted to programmes that were not leading to the acquisition of a degree: 
Estimating a dose-reponse function and adjusting for covariate-imbalance, they obtained an 
increasing dose-response for treatments up to 100 days and concluded that longer programs do 
not add an additional treatment effect. Their outcome variables were the employment probabil-
ity two years after programme entry and one year after programme exit.   8 
Finally, we sketch the results of several comparative programme studies for other countries: 
Gerfin and Lechner (2002) evaluated nine different Swiss active labour market programmes, 
focussing on the first programme participation of an unemployed. Their study showed that tem-
porary wage subsidies – paid in order to temporarily compensate income-losses in comparison 
to former times of employment (Zwischenverdienste) – has been most efficient in integrating 
participants into regular employment. Gerfin et al. (2004) contrasted employment programmes 
in non-profit organizations and temporary wage subsidies; again the latter were the more “suc-
cessful” programme. Sianesi (2008) compared six major Swedish active labour market pro-
grammes. Employment subsidies performed best by far; they were followed by trainee replace-
ment and labour market training. For Great Britain, Dorsett (2001) contrasted entries into sub-
sidised employment, full-time education and training, an environmental task force or a volun-
tary sector, which were different options within the New Deal Programme for Young People. 
Again, wage subsidies dominated all other options.  
Sianesi (2008) summarises as a main result of many micro studies that the more a programme 
resembles regular employment in the competitive sector, the higher the programme’s benefits to 
its participants will be. However, the underlying selection process for participation in wage and 
start-up subsidy programmes – which are most similar to regular work in the private sector – 
differs to a larger extent from the programmes analysed in our paper: In the case of wage subsi-
dies an employer must be willing to offer at least a subsidised job to an unemployed person, 
while founding a subsidised new enterprise requires that the founder has the initiative to do so.  
IV  EVALUATION APPROACH 
As most micro studies of active labour market programmes, our evaluation approach is based 
on the model of potential outcomes. We compare labour market outcomes of – comparable – 
participants receiving different “treatments”. In the basic version of the potential outcomes 
model (Rubin, 1974) an individual can potentially be in two states, while the outcome variable   9 
of interest may differ between these states. Based on Rubin’s work, Imbens (1999) and Lechner 
(2001) provided an extension to the case of multiple states. Denote participation in one of N 
treatments starting at time t by S
t Î {0,1,…,N}, and let the corresponding potential outcomes at 
time t+h be given by {Y0
t+h, Y1
t+h,…,YN
t+h}. Typically also non-participation at time t is inter-
preted as a particular kind of treatment. Because an individual may enter only one programme 
at time t, only one element of the latter set is observable, all other outcomes are unobserved 
“counterfactuals”. In our case the outcome variables under consideration will be the employ-
ment rate and cumulated days spent in regular employment after programme entry. Further-
more, t will be March 2003 and h will be 3.5 years.  
We assume that the value of the outcome variables for each person is not influenced by the 
actual participation of other persons (“Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption” SUTVA). 
Then the average effect of treatment J on participants in this programme, compared to receiving 





t = J] = E[YJ
t+h | S
t = J] – E[YK
t+h| S
t = J]. 
In the following, we will denote participants in programme J as the “treatment group” and par-
ticipants in programme K as the “comparison group”. It is not possible to observe the average 
counterfactual outcome that members of the treatment group J would have had, if they had par-
ticipated in programme K instead [YK
t+h| S
t = J]. Thus one has to find an adequate comparison 
group to impute the counterfactual outcome (Rubin 1974).  
With non-experimental data, statistical matching techniques might be applied to find such a 
comparison group – but only for those individuals in the treatment group J who have a positive 
probability to be in programme K instead (“Common Support Condition”). Statistical matching 
relies on “matching on observables”: Assume that all variables X, determining the participation 
decision as well as the expected success of a programme, are known and available. Then a 
comparison group of individuals receiving treatment K, with similar observable characteristics   10 
X to the treatment group J, may be chosen to obtain an estimate for the counterfactual outcome 
[YK
t+h| S
t = J]. Similar to the binary case (Rubin, 1974), Imbens (1999) and Lechner (1999; 





t | X – identifies the parameters of interest in the case of multiple treat-
ments.  
Thus the identifying assumption of statistical matching techniques is that no unobserved het-
erogeneity correlated with the selection into programmes and with outcome variables remains 
after accounting for observable variables. In contrast, duration analysis (in particular the tim-
ing-of-events approach by Abbring and van den Berg, 2003 and 2004) allows for selection on 
unobserved characteristics. But these models impose the identifying assumption that transition 
processes into labour market programmes as well as across labour market states can be mod-
elled as a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model, while statistical matching is a non-
parametric approach. 
Sianesi (2004, 2008) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2004) have pointed out that labour market 
programmes in Europe are ongoing and individuals may take up a programme sooner or later 
provided they are still eligible. But the unemployed themselves or the caseworker may decide 
against participation, because they expect or are expected to find regular employment soon. 
Thus selecting a comparison group of individuals who never participated in any programme 
would  lead  to  base  selection on expected (successful) future outcomes. Steiger (2004) and 
Stephan (2008) demonstrate empirically, how evaluation results vary with the choice of the 
classification window. We do not put any restrictions on the future of persons and define non-
participation in a particular programme as not taking up this programme during March 2003, 
but maybe at a later date. Following Sianesi (2004; 2008), we will denote this group as “wait-
ing”. Similarly, also participants in the programmes investigated might take part in another 
programme later.    11 
V  APPLIED METHOD AND COMMON SUPPORT PROBLEM 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that instead of matching on a high-dimensional vec-
tor of X-variables it is sufficient to match on the propensity score – the probability to join a 
programme – to obtain the same probability distribution for treated and non-treated individuals. 
Similar properties hold in a multiple treatment framework as well (Lechner, 2001). In conse-
quence, the same methods as in a binary treatment framework can be applied. First, propensity 
scores could be estimated separately for each combination of programmes J and K, using a bi-
nary probit or logit model. Second, the complete choice problem can be formulated in one 
model and estimated with a multinomial probit model, for instance. Lechner (2002) obtained 
basically the same estimation results, irrespective whether conditional probabilities were de-
rived from a multinomial model or estimated directly. Our analysis is based on the first ap-
proach, estimating 81 binary probit models, since we compare participation in nine programme 
variants  with  participation  in  the  other  eight  programme  variants  as  well  as  with  non-
participation. Note that estimated effects qJK
t+h and qKJ
t+h are not necessarily symmetric; esti-
mated effect refers to individuals within common support in the treatment group. 
While propensity score matching is a useful simplification and asymptotically all estimators 
should yield the same results, in small samples the choice of the matching algorithm and the 
determination of the region of common support can be important (Heckman et al., 1997; Smith, 
2000; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This problem is less severe when estimating the effects of 
program participation compared to non-participation, since the number of potential comparison 
persons is usually large. However, the number of potential comparison persons can be relatively 
small  in  cross-programme  comparisons.  In  consequence,  only  a  low share of the treatment 
group might be in common support. Furthermore, particular comparison observations might 
have a strong impact on results if a non-participant may be used as a comparison person more 
than once in the matching procedure (matching with replacement).   12 
In the following we compare results for two standard propensity score matching algorithms. 
First, we conduct a nearest neighbour matching without replacement that chooses for each par-
ticipant the non-participant with the most similar propensity score as a comparison person. This 
is rather for demonstration purposes, because we will partly end up with very few observations. 
Second, we perform radius matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) that matches participants with 
“synthetic  comparison  persons”,  composed  of  a  weighted  equivalent  of  all  persons  falling 
within the radius of their propensity score. As more data points are used, radius matching will 
result in lower variances compared to nearest neighbour matching. However, the bias of the 
estimates will be higher, because also more different comparison observations are used. 
We restrict our analysis on the region of common support and furthermore set a calliper – a 
maximum distance of propensity scores between treated and comparison persons – of 0.005 for 
cross-programme comparisons and of 0.0005 for comparisons with non-participants. The pro-
gramme impact is then estimated as the mean difference in the weighted outcomes of both 
groups. All estimates are performed using the STATA-module psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2003). Note that variance estimates for estimated treatment effects neglect that the propensity 
score itself has been estimated (Abadie and Imbens, 2006). 
To analyse common support, one possibility would be to present distributions of propensity 
scores or of relative weights from matching (Black and Smith, 2004); but each would require 
162  graphs.  Instead,  we  compute  Lechner  bounds  (Lechner  2000;  Caliendo  and  Kopeinig, 
2008) to test for the sensitivity of estimated treatment effects with respect to the common sup-
port problem. The lower (upper) Lechner bound is given by the weighted average of a) the es-
timated average treatment effect and b) the average distance of observations for treated persons 
throughout common support from the upper (lower) bounded potential outcome. Weights are 
given by probabilities a) to be or b) not to be within common support. We test if estimated ef-
fects will be still significant after computing confidence intervals around these bounds. In the 
Appendix we will present the underlying shares of individuals in the treatment group that are   13 
within common support. Additionally, we display the maximum weight across comparison per-
sons as a share of treated persons to see how heavily observations are used in constructing the 
counterfactuals.  Note  that  the  weight  of  a  comparison  person  is  always  one  for  nearest 
neighbour matching without replacement, thus the share of treated persons is 1/N (with N as the 
number of treated persons), but the share maybe smaller or larger using radius matching. 
Finally, to test the quality of matching, the mean standardised bias (MSB) (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983) between each treated group and its matched comparison group is computed across 
all variables of X. The standardised bias of a covariate is defined as the difference of means in 
the treated and matched comparison sample, divided by the square root of the average sample 
variance. Thus, a lower value of the MSB indicates more similarity between the two groups. 
While no clear theoretical indication exists as to which remaining bias might be acceptable, 
Caliendo and Hujer (2006) summarise as a rule of thumb that most studies assess a reduction of 
the MSB after matching to 3 or 5 percent as sufficient. We follow this suggestion and interpret 
pairwise comparisons where the remaining MSB after matching exceeded the value of 5 percent 
as programme types that are in fact not comparable in terms of their participants.  
VI  DATA AND VARIABLES 
The empirical analysis is based on the TrEffeR-data set (Stephan et al., 2006). This administra-
tive data set has been constructed for monitoring purposes of the German Public Employment 
Service. The current version merges data flows from computer based operative systems of the 
Public Employment Service on periods of registered job search, registered unemployment, par-
ticipation in labour market programmes and employment for the period from 2000 to 2007.  
The sample analysed here covers individuals of age 25 to 59, who were unemployed for no 
longer than one year in March 2003. Individuals entering one of these programme variants dur-
ing March 2003 are included in the cross-programme comparison, while those not entering a   14 
programme are interpreted to be in a state of “waiting”. As is done most often in the literature, 
only the first programme entry during an unemployment spell is analysed; the distance to the 
previous unemployment spell has to amount to at least one month.  
We restrict our analysis to the programme variants described in Table 2. We also distinguish 
between different completed programme durations (up to three months, 4 to 6 months, 7 to 12 
months and more than 12 months). Our data do not include information on planned programme 
duration. Presumably, participants exit a programme prior to its planned completion if they find 
a job during participation or if they do not expect to find a job even with the help of the pro-
gramme. Hence, completed duration might be correlated with the outcome of treatment as well 
as with individual characteristics. However, Kluve et al. (2007) found that instrumental variable 
estimates using planned duration as instruments were not significantly different from estimates 
utilizing information on completed duration. They conclude that estimates relying on actual 
training duration do not suffer strongly from endogeneity. 
Table 2   Analysed programme variants 
1. Further vocational training (Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung) 
a)  Provision of specific professional skills, which might contain occupation-related training and 
general training (berufsbezogene übergreifende Weiterbildung, berufspraktische Weiterbildung 
oder berufliche Aufstiegsweiterbildung). 
b)  Practical training in a practice firm, without trainees working in a “real” company (berufliche 
Weiterbildung  in einer Übungsfirma, Übungswerkstatt oder sonstigen Übungseinrichtung) 
c)  Long retraining programmes, conducted firm-external within a group (Gruppenmaßnahme mit 
Abschluss in anerkanntem Ausbildungsberuf)  
2. Short training programme (Trainingsmaßnahme) 
a)  Short classroom training, aimed at the improvement of knowledge and skills (Nicht-
betriebliche Trainingsmaßnahme zur Vermittlung von Kenntnissen)  
b)  Short firm-internal training, aimed at the improvement of knowledge and skills (Betriebliche 
Trainingsmaßnahme zur Vermittlung von Kenntnissen) 
3. Job creation scheme of the traditional type I from Table 1 (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahme) 
   15 
We estimate programme effects on participants using two outcome variables: First, we compute 
cumulated  days  spent  in  regular,  unsubsidised  employment  during  the  3.5  years  after  pro-
gramme entry in March 2003. Second, we compute shares in regular, unsubsidised employment 
3.5 years after programme entry. Times of subsidised employment (for instance by a wage sub-
sidy) and of “marginal” employment are not interpreted as a “success” in this sense. Outcome 
variables for “waiting” non-participants are measured since March 15, 2003, and all individuals 
who had already left unemployment at this date were excluded from the sample. 
Cumulated effects display the evolvement of estimated programme effects over the entire ob-
servation period of time; they can be computed as the integral over employment shares during 
each day of the observation period: Thus they account for locking-in effects – times of reduced 
search – over the time period of programme participation. The share in regular employment at 
the end of the observation period refers only to one particular reporting day. However, it may 
be interpreted as an indicator that shows how cumulated days in employment will develop fur-
ther after the end of the observation period: If the average effect on the share of participants in 
employment is positive, the average effect on cumulated days will turn more positive over time. 
The choice of comparison groups is based on a wide range of individual socio-demographic 
characteristics (measured at the start of an unemployment spell), unemployment duration in the 
current spell, (un-)employment history in the two years preceding the analysed unemployment 
spell, and the regional labour market situation (performance cluster according to Blien et al. 
2004). Since the data include information on previous unemployment histories, these should 
capture most of the effects of unobserved individual factors (Heckman et al., 1999). Mean val-
ues of the explaining variables can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. It shows that par-
ticipants in a specific programme differ in fact from the average non-participant as well as from 
participants in other programmes. In particular, participants in all training programmes seem to 
be a “positive selection” of unemployed persons, whereas those joining a job creation scheme 
can be considered as a “negative selection”.   16 
VII  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Common support and matching quality 
Table 3 summarizes information on the significance and quality of the results: For each combi-
nation of programmes, column I contains information on the sign and significance of the esti-
mated effect (++/-- indicates that results that are significant at a = 0.01, while +/- shows that 
they are significant at a = 0.05). This information is complemented in column II by information 
on the sign and significance taking into account Lechner bounds. If results in column I and II 
differ, estimated treatment effects are sensitive with respect to the common support problem. 
Furthermore, column III of Table 3 indicates if the mean standardised bias after matching is 
below “acceptable” values of 3 (##) or 5 (#), respectively. For ease of interpretation, compari-
sons where we find a significant effect using Lechner bounds as well as satisfying matching 
quality are shaded in light grey. Background information can be found in Table A2 in the Ap-
pendix that shows in Panel 1, which share of the treatment group J is within common support. 
Panel 2 displays the maximum weight given to a comparison person. Finally, Table A3 in the 
Appendix displays the mean standardised bias (MSB) before and after matching.  
Table 3 indicates that – independently from the matching algorithm chosen – we do not face a 
common support problem if programme entry during March 2003 is compared with “waiting” 
during this month. However, the picture is different for pairwise programme comparisons: For 
nearest neighbour matching without replacement, significant point estimates go hand in hand 
with insignificant effects when Lechner bounds are taken into account. This problem is less 
severe for radius matching. Table A.2 shows the underlying reason: At least 70 percent of the 
treatment group are in common support using radius matching, while the minimum share in 
common support amounts to only 12 percent for nearest neighbour matching without replace-
ment (when comparing participants in short classroom training with those in longer job creation 
scheme).    17 
Table 3  Sign and significance of point estimates (I), sign and significance taking 
into account Lechner bounds (II) and matching quality (III) 
Comparison group K (type and duration in months) 
          Practice  Re-    Job creation 
       Provision of skills  firm  training  Short training  Scheme  Treatment group J (type 
and duration in months)  Waiting  <4  4-6  7-12  4-6  >12  in firm  in firm  4-6  7-12 
  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III 
1 Cumulated days in regular employment 
1.1 Nearest neighbour matching without replacement 
Provision of skills, <4  ++ ++ ##                 ## ++  +  ##        ## ++     ##  --  --  ## ++ ++ ## ++     #  ++     ## 
Provision of skills, 4-6  ++ ++ ##        ##           ++     ##        #  ++     ##  --  --  ## ++ ++ ## ++     ## ++     # 
Provision of skills, 7-12        ##  --     ##  --     ##                 #  ++     ##  --  --  ##        ## ++     ## ++     ## 
Practice firm, 4-6        #  -     ##        ##        #           ++     #  --  --  ##        #  ++        ++     # 
Retraining, >12  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --     #           --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --     #        # 
Short training in firm  ++ ++ ## ++     ## ++     ## ++     ## ++     ## ++     ##           ++ ++ ## ++     #  ++     # 
Short training in class  ++ ++ ##  --     ##  --     ##        ##        #  ++     ##  --     ##           ++     ## ++     ## 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  -  -  ##  --     #  --     #  --     ##  --        ++     #  --  --  ##  --  --  ##           ++     ## 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  --  --  ##  --     #  --     ##  --     ##  --     #  +     #  --  --  #  --  --  ##        ##          
1.2 Radius matching 
Provision of skills, <4  ++ ++ ##                 ## ++ ++ ## ++     ## ++ ++  #  --  --  ## ++ ++ ## ++ ++     ++ ++    
Provision of skills, 4-6  ++ ++ ##        ##           ++ ++ ##  +     ## ++ ++ ##  --  --  ## ++ ++ ## ++  +     ++ ++    
Provision of skills, 7-12  +  +  ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##                 #  ++ ++ ##  --  --  ##        ##                   
Practice firm, 4-6  +  +  ##  -     #  -  -  ##        ##           ++ ++  #  --  --  ##        ##           ++       
Retraining, >12  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --  --  #           --  --  ##  --  --  ##  --  --     --       
Short training in firm  ++ ++ ## ++ ++ ## ++ ++ ## ++ ++ ## ++ ++  #  ++ ++  #           ++ ++ ## ++ ++     ++ ++    
Short training in class  ++ ++ ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##        ##        #  ++ ++ ##  --  --  ##                    ++  +    
Job creation scheme, 4-6  --  --  ##  --  --     --  --     --  --  #           +        --  --  #  --  --  ##           ++     ## 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  --  --  ##  --  --     --  --     --  --  #  --                 --  --  #  --  --  ##  --  --  ##          
2. Share in regular employment 
2.1 Nearest neighbour matching without replacement 
Provision of skills, <4  ++ ++ ##                 ##        ##        ##  --     ##  --  --  ##  +  +  ## ++     #  +     ## 
Provision of skills, 4-6  ++ ++ ## ++     ##                 ##        #        ##        ## ++ ++ ## ++     ## ++     # 
Provision of skills, 7-12  ++ ++ ##        ##        ##                 #  -     ##  --     ## ++ ++ ## ++     ## ++     ## 
Practice firm, 4-6  ++ ++  #        ##        ##        #                 #        ##        #  ++        +     # 
Retraining, >12  ++ ++ ## ++     ##        ## ++     ##        #                 ## ++ ++ ## ++     #  ++     # 
Short training in firm  ++ ++ ## ++     ##        ## ++     ##        ##        ##           ++ ++ ## ++     #  ++     # 
Short training in class  ++ ++ ##  --     ##  --     ##  --     ##  -     #  --     ##  --     ##           +     ##  +     ## 
Job creation scheme, 4-6        ##  -     #  --     #  --     ##  --        --     #  --     ##  --     ##                 ## 
Job creation scheme, 7-12        ##  -     #  --     ##  --     ##        #  --     #  --     #        ##        ##          
2.2 Radius matching 
Provision of skills, <4  ++ ++ ##           --  -  ##        ##        ##        #  --  --  ## ++ ++ ## ++                
Provision of skills, 4-6  ++ ++ ## ++  +  ##                 ##        ##        ##  -     ## ++ ++ ## ++ ++     ++  +    
Provision of skills, 7-12  ++ ++ ##        ##        ##                 #        ##  --  --  ## ++ ++ ##                   
Practice firm, 4-6  ++ ++ ##        #        ##        ##                 #  -  -  ## ++ ++ ##           +       
Retraining, >12  ++ ++ ## ++ ++ ##  +     ## ++ ++ ##        #                 ## ++ ++ ## ++ ++     ++       
Short training in firm  ++ ++ ## ++ ++ ##        ## ++ ++ ##        #        #           ++ ++ ## ++ ++     ++ ++    
Short training in class  ++ ++ ##        ##  --  --  ##  --  --  ##  -  -  #  --  --  ##  --  --  ##                            
Job creation scheme, 4-6        ##           -        --  --  #           --  --     --  --  #  --  --  ##                 ## 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  +     ##  -        -        --  --  #  -        --  --     --  --  #        ##        ##          
++ (+) indicates qJK
3.5 > 0 and a = 0.01 (0.05).  
-- (-) indicates qJK
3.5 < 0 and a = 0.01 (0.05).  
## (#) indicates a mean standardised bias < 3 (5).  
Shaded in light grey: Significant taking into account Lechner-bounds and MSB < 5. 
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.   
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These results clearly underline that matching without replacement is not advisable if the num-
ber of potential comparison persons is small. The other side of the coin is that the same obser-
vation may be used very often as a comparison person if matching takes place with replace-
ment. Panel 2 of Table A2 show that the maximum weight as share of the treatment group is 
partly smaller, partly larger in the “waiting” group compared to nearest neighbour matching 
without replacement. It is, however, usually larger for cross-programme comparisons. In par-
ticular, maximum weights are large if comparison persons have participated in a job creation 
schemes. They increase up to 10 percent of the treatment group (provision of skills, 4 to 6 
months); thus one particular person participating in a job creation scheme is used as a compari-
son person for one tenth of treated persons. This shades a first doubt on the reliability of the 
estimates where individuals taking up training are compared to similar persons joining a job 
creation scheme. 
Matching quality is better for radius matching than for nearest neighbour matching without 
replacement,  if  we  compare  programme  participants with “waiting” non-participants (Table 
A3). For cross-programme comparisons, results differ not strongly between both matching algo-
rithms regarding training programmes. Matching quality – measured by the mean standardised 
bias after matching – is usually good (MSB < 5) or very good (MSB < 3). This is differently for 
comparisons including participation in a job creation scheme, if radius matching is applied. 
While for nearest neighbour matching without replacement matching quality is mostly accept-
able for job creations schemes, this is paid for by dropping the majority of cases from common 
support (Table A2).  
As  robustness  checks,  we  applied  several  further  matching  algorithms.  Results  of  nearest 
neighbour matching without replacement were rather invariant to another sorting of observa-
tions. Smaller variations of the callipers chosen did not have a qualitative impact on results. 
However, results for comparisons including job creation schemes differ strongly from those  
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presented above if we match nearest neighbours without any calliper; this implies that treated 
persons and comparison persons can be rather different in terms of their propensity scores.  
Summing up, for our analysis radius matching should be preferred against nearest neighbour 
matching without replacement; the common support problem is too severe for the latter one. 
Thus we will restrict the following discussion on the results from radius matching. Further-
more, participants in job creation schemes should in most cases not be compared with partici-
pants in training schemes – we cannot achieve a good matching quality and at the same time a 
satisfying solution of the common support problem. 
Joining a programme compared to “waiting” 
We begin with a discussion of the mean effects of a programme entry compared to no or a later 
participation (“waiting”), restricting the following discussion to the findings from radius match-
ing. Results at the end of the observation period are summarised in Table 4. Figure 1 and 2 
show the development of outcome variables for the treated group and the comparison group as 
well as estimated treatment effects over the entire observation period. As can be seen from Fig-
ure 2, employment evolves cyclically during the calendar year. 
Table 4:   Estimated effect of participation in programme J compared to waiting, 
3.5 years after programme entry 
Treatment group J (type and duration in months)  
   Practice  Re-    Job creation 
Provision of skills  firm  training  Short training  scheme 
Regular employment  <4  4-6  7-12  4-6  >12  in firm  in class  4-6  7-12 
Cumulated days    112  **   92 **   20 *  38 *  -146 **  206  **  27 **  -40  **  -52 ** 
Share    0.09  **   0.14 **   0.12 **  0.12 **  0.20 **  0.15  **  0.05 **  0.01    0.03 * 
*) a = 0.05, **) a = 0.01.  
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
Shaded in light grey: Significant taking into account Lechner-bounds and MSB < 5. 
Matching algorithm: Radius matching with calliper of 0.0005.   
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Figure 1  Cumulated days in regular employment during the 3.5 years after pro-
gramme entry: Averages for treatment and comparison group as well as 
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Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
Matching algorithm: Radius matching with calliper of 0.0005.  
Overall, Table 4 and Figure 1 show rather mixed results of programme participation on cumu-
lated days the participants have spent in regular employment during the 3.5 years after treat-
ment start. We find highly significant positive effects of further vocational training providing 
professional skills with programme durations of up to six months. Longer training providing 
skills for 7 to 12 months as well as training in practice firms for 4 to 6 months have significant, 
but small effects on the number of days in regular employment. The cumulated effect of long 
retraining programmes is significantly negative. However, this is not surprising, because sub-
stantial lock-in effects are a necessary side-effect of this kind of programmes. Regarding short 
training programmes, the effect on days spent in employment amounts to about 200 days for 
firm-internal programmes, but is small for classroom training. This underlines the fact that it is 
important to distinguish between different variants of short training programmes. Finally, job  
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creation schemes with duration between 7 and 12 months have significant negative effects on 
cumulated days spent in employment. 
Figure 2  Share in regular employment during the 3.5 years after programme entry: 
Averages for treatment and comparison group as well as average treat-
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Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
Matching algorithm: Radius matching with calliper of 0.0005.  
A surprising fact is, however, that we obtain mostly significantly positive effects on shares of 
participants in regular employment, 3.5 years after programme entry (Table 4 and Figure 2). 
The only exceptions are shorter job creation schemes that have insignificant effects at the end 
of the observation period. Furthermore, effects are largest for long retraining schemes and arise 
– as can be seen in Figure 2 – only at the very end of the observation period. Thus, one can 
expect  that  cumulated  effects  also  could  have  turned  positive  for  all  further  training  pro-
grammes if the observation period would have been longer.  
These results are in line with those obtained by Biewen et al. (2007) and Rinne et al. (2007), 
who found also (at least partly) positive employment effects of further vocational training and  
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short training programme, but different from the findings of Wunsch and Lechner (2008). One 
reason might be that the latter analysed a shorter time period after programme entry (30 months 
compared to 42 months in this study), while programme effects might take some time to break 
even. Second, Wunsch and Lechner (2008) restricted their sample to the age group 25 to 49. 
However, our results are even more positive, if we introduce a similar age restriction. Third, we 
analyse only (short-term unemployed) persons who entered a programme during the first year 
of their unemployment spell. Fourth, Wunsch and Lechner (2008) defined non-participants as 
persons who did not enter a programme during the 18 months following the inflow date into 
their sample. In contrast, Biewen et al. (2007) as well as Rinne et al. (2007) performed separate 
estimates by duration of unemployment at the beginning of a treatment and required only that 
non-participants did not enter a measure during an accordingly chosen classification window. 
We defined all those individuals, who did not enter a programme during one single month, as 
non-participants. For job creation schemes our results are similar to the findings of Caliendo et 
al.  (2006;  2008a;  2008b),  who  observed  a  negative  impact  of  participation  in  job  creation 
schemes on the employment prospects of participants. While we obtain non-negative, but insig-
nificant effects of participation on shares in employment at the end of the observation period, 
we observe outcome variables for a slightly longer period of time (42 instead of 36 months) and 
analyse programme entries starting three years later than these authors did (2003 instead of 
2000). 
Pairwise comparison of programme participations 
We turn now to a pairwise comparison of participation in particular programmes, which is pre-
sented in Table 5. We usually find a sufficiently “good” comparison group when comparing 
participation in variants of further vocational training schemes and short training schemes. Re-
garding  further  vocational  training  programmes,  it  seems  that  participants  in  shorter  pro-
grammes have spent more days in regular employment during the observation period. However, 
the mostly insignificant differences in shares in employment indicate that this “advantage” may  
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not continue to increase over time. Thus the more positive effects of shorter programmes on 
cumulated days spent in employment are clearly an effect of the lock-in effects of participation 
increasing with programme duration. Furthermore, when Lechner bounds are taken into ac-
count, differences in both outcome variables are mostly insignificant comparing training, aimed 
at the provision of skills, with training in a practice firm. 
Table 5   Estimated effect of participation in programme J compared to  
participation in programme K, 3.5 years after programme entry 
Comparison group K (type and duration in months)  
   Practice  Re-    Job creation 
Provision of skills  firm  training  Short training  scheme  Treatment group J (type 
and duration in months)  <4  4-6  7-12  4-6  >12  in firm  in class  4-6  7-12 
1. Cumulated days in regular employment 
Provision of skills, <4        18    99 **  87  **  323 **  -93  **  92  **  176  **  199 ** 
Provision of skills, 4-6  -14           70 **  60  *  281 **  -128  **  68  **  141  **  130 ** 
Provision of skills, 7-12  -91  **  -80 **        -37     213 **  -197  **  -8     8     35   
Practice firm, 4-6  -65  *  -51 *  22          241 **  -191  **  19     11     105 ** 
Retraining, >12  -237  **  -280 **  -186 **  -206  **        -379  **  -174  **  -138  **  -94 ** 
Short training in firm  113  **  117 **  194 **  194  **  430 **        188  **  264  **  285 ** 
Short training in class  -71  **  -65 **  2    6     209 **  -201  **        57     97 ** 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  -120  **  -130 **  -86 **  -94     59 *  -255  **  -87  **        48 ** 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  -201  **  -124 **  -121 **  -158  **  -15    -292  **  -93  **  -45  **       
2. Share in regular employment 
Provision of skills, <4        -0.05 **  -0.02    -0.04     -0.05    -0.07  **  0.05  **  0.13  **  0.07   
Provision of skills, 4-6  0.06  **        0.02    0.01     -0.02    -0.03  *  0.09  **  0.20  **  0.12 ** 
Provision of skills, 7-12  0.02     -0.03          -0.06     -0.05    -0.05  **  0.07  **  0.09     0.01   
Practice firm, 4-6  0.04     -0.01    0.01          -0.06    -0.06  *  0.08  **  0.07     0.11 * 
Retraining, >12  0.14  **  0.05 *  0.07 **  0.06           0.03     0.15  **  0.21  **  0.15 ** 
Short training in firm  0.08  **  0.02    0.05 **  0.06     0.03          0.11  **  0.21  **  0.15 ** 
Short training in class  -0.01     -0.09 **  -0.07 **  -0.07  *  -0.12 **  -0.13  **        0.06     0.01   
Job creation scheme, 4-6  -0.04     -0.10 *  -0.13 **  -0.13     -0.25 **  -0.14  **  -0.06  **        0.01   
Job creation scheme, 7-12  -0.10  *  -0.09 *  -0.13 **  -0.17  *  -0.30 **  -0.15  **  -0.03     0.00          
*) a = 0.05, **) a = 0.01.  
 Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
Shaded in light grey: Significant taking into account Lechner-bounds and MSB < 5. 
Matching algorithm: Radius matching with calliper of 0.005.  
Lock-in effects are naturally largest for long retraining programmes, and thus retraining per-
forms worst among all programmes when comparing cumulated days in regular employment 
during the 3.5 years after programme start. However, the share in employment at the end of the 
observation period is marginally significantly larger than is the case for several shorter further 
vocational training programmes. This implies that the effectiveness of retraining programmes  
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measured by cumulated days in employment could be supposed to increase further over time. 
For this programme, Lechner et al. (2005, Table 6.1, 38) found rather positive – but only partly 
significant results – for an observation period of seven years, compared to shorter programmes.  
The “winners” in the pairwise comparison are obviously short training programmes conducted 
within firms: Participants spend more days in regular employment than those in every other 
programme, while they would have fared far worse in most other programmes. The explanation 
at hand is that short firm-internal training programmes are – similarly to wage subsidies – not 
only a training programme, but rather a training programme in combination with access to a 
firm. They offer participants the possibility not only to increase their productivity, but also to 
convey their productivity to a potential employer. They may thus be used as a kind of cheap 
probation period by employers, where the “wage” is paid by the Public Employment Service.  
In contrast, participants in short classroom training have spent less days in regular employment 
during the observation period than those individuals participating in further vocational training 
aimed at the provision of skills with an duration of up to six months; and also participants in the 
latter fared better with their training compared to a short classroom training. Thus one might 
conclude that previous results of Biewen et al. (2007) and Wunsch and Lechner (2008), who 
obtained no advantages of participation in further vocational training compared to short pro-
grammes, are partly a result of the fact that these studies did not distinguish between variants of 
short training programmes.  
Finally, as has already been discussed, it is mostly not possible to find a satisfactory compara-
ble group of individuals participating in a training programme for participants in job creation 
schemes, vice versa. Differences in characteristics of participants are due to the age structure of 
participants (for instance, retraining is typically granted for younger workers, while participants 
in job creation schemes are in average older) and to time spent in unemployment during the last 
years, but also due to the regional distribution of programme assignment (the overwhelming  
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majority of entries in job creation schemes in March 2003 took place in Berlin and within other 
East German urban areas with high unemployment). 
VIII  CONCLUSIONS 
For Germany, our paper estimated the effects of participation in further training programmes, 
short training programmes and job creation schemes, starting in March 2003, as well as the 
relative effectiveness of these programmes. The analysis was restricted to persons of age 25 to 
59 and on the first programme during the first year of an unemployment spell.  
First, our analysis demonstrated that estimates of relative programme effectiveness face more 
severe problems of common support than the more often conducted estimates of programme 
effects compared to a state of “waiting” – simply because the number of potential comparison 
persons participating in other programmes is smaller. Thus it is important to match with re-
placement. Furthermore, for participants in job creation schemes it is mostly difficult to find an 
adequate comparison group from participants in training programmes, vice versa. That might be 
taken as a hint that participants in this programme – whose objective is explicitly not to achieve 
employment but to increase employability – are in fact a strongly selected group of hard-to-
place individuals. Other programmes available in the time period investigated might not have 
been suitable for this group. Thus, it remains at least questionable whether participation in an-
other programme could have improved the labour market prospects of participants in job crea-
tion schemes. 
Second, compared to non-participation in the sense of “waiting”, we find that participation in 
further vocational training aimed at the provision of skills as well as short training programmes 
increase the number of days that participants have spent in regular employment during the 3.5 
years after programme start. In contrast, participation in retraining and job creation schemes  
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decreases the number of days. However, all programmes had a positive impact on the share of 
participants in regular employment at the end of the observation period. 
Third, the pairwise comparison of programmes conveys the impression that across further voca-
tional training programmes, shorter programmes perform overall better; this is mostly the result 
of shorter lock-in effects. Also participation in further training aimed at the provision of skills 
with duration of up to six months has been more advantageous for treated persons than short 
classroom training would have been. In contrast, short firm-internal training is by the far the 
most “successful” programme in the portfolio of programmes included in this investigation. 
This is, however, probably related to the fundamentally different design of this programme, 
which requires an employer willing to offer a training opportunity.  
Overall, our study indicates that in the longer run participation in training programmes – but not 
in job creation schemes – supports the reintegration of previously unemployed workers into the 
labour  market.  Comparing  programmes,  some  variants  of  further  vocational  training  pro-
grammes (aimed at the provision of skills and with duration of up to 6 months) have been rela-
tively more effective – but at the same time also more costly – than short classroom training. 
Participants in job creation schemes differ too strongly from participants in training schemes to 
conduct a reliable comparison. Still, our results refer to the impact of programmes on individual 
employment prospects of participants; Layard et al. (1991, 481) emphasise that for a judgment 
of the welfare costs of a programme much more has to be taken into account: Beneath the pro-
gramme costs and the employment effects at the macro level, output benefits, psychic benefits 
and social costs, as well as the distributional incidence of active labour market programmes 
have to be considered.   
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Table A.1   Variable means (0 = no, 1 = yes) before matching 
        Pract.  Retrai-    Job creation 
   Wait-  Provision of skills  firm  ning  Short training  scheme 
Variables  ing  <4  4-6  6-12  4-6  >12  in firm  in class  4-6  6-12 
a) Socio-demographic characteristics                               
Female  0.42  0.32  0.44  0.43  0.53  0.56  0.33  0.52  0.44  0.47 
Age 25-29  0.14  0.18  0.16  0.12  0.14  0.24  0.22  0.16  0.08  0.06 
Age 30-34  0.16  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.18  0.25  0.20  0.18  0.09  0.08 
Age 35-39  0.18  0.20  0.24  0.22  0.16  0.26  0.20  0.21  0.12  0.12 
Age 40-44  0.16  0.19  0.19  0.22  0.22  0.16  0.17  0.19  0.14  0.14 
Age 45-49  0.14  0.15  0.13  0.14  0.19  0.07  0.12  0.14  0.18  0.19 
Age 50-54  0.13  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.07  0.10  0.24  0.24 
Age 54-59  0.09  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.16  0.17 
Health problems  0.12  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.11  0.20 
Slightly disabeled  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.06 
Severly disabeled  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.08  0.12 
Married  0.54  0.53  0.56  0.54  0.58  0.52  0.48  0.52  0.62  0.57 
Married and female  0.25  0.16  0.25  0.25  0.31  0.32  0.15  0.29  0.29  0.29 
Foreigner  0.13  0.08  0.11  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.05 
Without secondary degree  0.12  0.06  0.07  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.08 
Secondary degree (Hauptschule)  0.46  0.34  0.35  0.24  0.36  0.31  0.39  0.34  0.32  0.36 
Secondary degree (Realschule)  0.30  0.44  0.38  0.40  0.45  0.49  0.38  0.38  0.48  0.42 
Secondary degree (Gymnasium)  0.12  0.17  0.21  0.33  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.21  0.13  0.15 
Without vocational training  0.32  0.18  0.22  0.14  0.19  0.31  0.19  0.21  0.14  0.21 
Vocational training  0.62  0.75  0.67  0.69  0.75  0.65  0.74  0.68  0.78  0.70 
University degree  0.06  0.07  0.10  0.17  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.07  0.09 
Unemployment benefit receipt  0.50  0.68  0.63  0.61  0.66  0.54  0.66  0.57  0.69  0.66 
Unemployment assistance receipt  0.15  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.19  0.11  0.12  0.19  0.22 
No benefit receipt  0.35  0.22  0.27  0.28  0.23  0.27  0.23  0.31  0.12  0.13 
b) Month of program entry                               
1st month of unemployment  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.18  0.16  0.10  0.06  0.07 
2nd month of unemployment  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.15  0.13  0.07  0.09 
3rd month of unemployment  0.17  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.11  0.16  0.18  0.08  0.08 
4th month of unemployment  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11 
5th month of unemployment  0.09  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.07 
6th month of unemployment  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.09  0.10  0.08 
7th month of unemployment  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.09  0.10 
8th month of unemployment  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.09 
9th month of unemployment  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.07 
10th month of unemployment  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.08  0.08 
11th month of unemployment  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.08 
12th month of unemployment  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.08 
c) 2-year-history preceding current spell                               
Unemployed up to 1 month  0.42  0.54  0.57  0.55  0.55  0.47  0.48  0.55  0.37  0.31 
Unemployed 1-6 months  0.18  0.21  0.18  0.18  0.20  0.16  0.22  0.18  0.17  0.17 
Unemployed 7-12 months  0.18  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.17  0.13  0.20  0.23 
Unemployed 13-18 months  0.12  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.07  0.11  0.08  0.08  0.15  0.16 
Unemployed 19-24 months  0.10  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.11  0.04  0.06  0.11  0.14 
Participation in active labour market programmes  0.27  0.27  0.23  0.28  0.24  0.35  0.34  0.26  0.37  0.48 
Period of sickness  0.14  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.17  0.20 
Sanction imposed  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
d) Regional labour market situation                               
East Germany, worst situation  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.19  0.06 
East Germany, bad situation  0.19  0.24  0.18  0.21  0.20  0.31  0.16  0.19  0.32  0.44 
East Germany, high unemployment  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Metropolitan area, high unemployment  0.10  0.11  0.08  0.13  0.01  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.34  0.27 
Metropolitan area, medium unemployment  0.11  0.15  0.14  0.16  0.04  0.10  0.11  0.13  0.03  0.06 
Above average unemp., moderate dynamics  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.02  0.02 
Rural area, average unemployment  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.05  0.09  0.02  0.08  0.04  0.00  0.02 
Rural area, below average unemployment  0.13  0.09  0.14  0.10  0.14  0.18  0.18  0.11  0.01  0.03 
Metropolitan area, good situation, high dynamics  0.09  0.03  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.08  0.16  0.01  0.02 
Rural area, good situation and high dynamics  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Small-business dominated, good situation  0.09  0.06  0.12  0.08  0.17  0.05  0.09  0.09  0.02  0.02 
Region with very good situation  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.00 
Mean programme duration     57  149  278  154  820  30  44  174  318 
Cumulated days in employment after 3.5 years  324  535  486  402  428  205  625  395  223  178 
Share in regular employment after 3.5 years  0.32  0.51  0.53  0.50  0.51  0.55  0.57  0.41  0.28  0.26 
Observations  192460  1146  1744  2332  532  1121  3967  7792  1199  1039 
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  APPENDIX 
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Table A.2  Share of treatment group J within common support  
and maximum weight of a comparison person as share of treated persons 
Comparison group K (type and duration in months) 
      Practice  Re-    Job creation 
   Provision of skills  firm  training  Short training  scheme  Treatment group J  
(type and duration in months)  Waiting  <4  4-6  7-12  4-6  >12  in firm in class  4-6  7-12 
1 Share of treatment group J within common support 
1.1 Nearest neighbour matching without replacement 
Provision of skills, <4  1.00    0.93  0.92  0.38  0.55  0.99  0.99  0.37  0.36 
Provision of skills, 4-6  1.00  0.61    0.85  0.30  0.47  0.96  0.99  0.28  0.28 
Provision of skills, 7-12  1.00  0.45  0.64    0.21  0.39  0.85  0.97  0.30  0.27 
Practice firm, 4-6  1.00  0.82  0.98  0.92    0.63  0.98  1.00  0.40  0.42 
Retraining, >12  1.00  0.56  0.74  0.80  0.30    0.91  0.98  0.33  0.31 
Short training in firm  1.00  0.29  0.42  0.50  0.13  0.26    0.92  0.17  0.17 
Short training in class  1.00  0.15  0.22  0.29  0.07  0.14  0.47    0.13  0.12 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  1.00  0.35  0.40  0.58  0.18  0.31  0.57  0.82    0.67 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  0.99  0.40  0.47  0.61  0.22  0.33  0.63  0.87  0.78   
1.2 Radius matching 
Provision of skills, <4  1.00    0.99  0.98  0.93  0.93  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.88 
Provision of skills, 4-6  1.00  0.99    0.99  0.96  0.96  0.99  1.00  0.99  0.97 
Provision of skills, 7-12  1.00  0.99  1.00    0.89  0.98  0.99  1.00  0.97  0.99 
Practice firm, 4-6  1.00  0.97  0.99  0.97    0.89  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.78 
Retraining, >12  1.00  0.97  0.98  0.99  0.90    0.99  1.00  0.91  0.85 
Short training in firm  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.95    1.00  1.00  0.98 
Short training in class  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.99  0.94  0.99    0.93  0.96 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  1.00  0.93  0.87  0.95  0.84  0.75  0.92  0.97    0.97 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  0.99  0.94  0.94  0.93  0.79  0.70  0.89  0.98  0.98   
2 Maximum weight of a comparison person as share of treated persons 
2.1 Nearest neighbour matching with replacement (1/N) 
Provision of skills, <4  0.001    0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002 
Provision of skills, 4-6  0.001  0.001    0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002 
Provision of skills, 7-12  0.0004  0.001  0.001    0.002  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.002 
Practice firm, 4-6  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002    0.003  0.002  0.002  0.005  0.004 
Retraining, >12  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003    0.001  0.001  0.003  0.003 
Short training in firm  0.0003  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001    0.0003  0.001  0.002 
Short training in class  0.0001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.0003    0.001  0.001 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.005  0.003  0.001  0.001    0.001 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.001   
2.2 Radius matching 
Provision of skills, <4  0.0001    0.003  0.005  0.015  0.018  0.002  0.002  0.043  0.033 
Provision of skills, 4-6  0.001  0.008    0.004  0.024  0.016  0.002  0.001  0.106  0.048 
Provision of skills, 7-12  0.001  0.009  0.008    0.013  0.016  0.003  0.003  0.058  0.043 
Practice firm, 4-6  0.0001  0.016  0.004  0.008    0.027  0.005  0.002  0.065  0.055 
Retraining, >12  0.001  0.016  0.009  0.006  0.025    0.008  0.003  0.054  0.029 
Short training in firm  0.0003  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.017  0.013    0.002  0.040  0.033 
Short training in class  0.0003  0.012  0.004  0.004  0.018  0.012  0.003    0.027  0.021 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  0.001  0.036  0.026  0.020  0.097  0.051  0.019  0.008    0.017 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  0.001  0.028  0.037  0.014  0.068  0.060  0.014  0.007  0.006   
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  APPENDIX 
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Table A.3  Mean standardized bias before and after matching 
Comparison group K (type and duration in months) 
      Practice  Re-    Job creation 
   Provision of skills  firm  training  Short training  scheme  Treatment group J  
(type and duration in months)  Waiting  <4  4-6  7-12  4-6  >12  in firm in class  4-6  7-12 
1 Mean standardised bias before matching 
Provision of skills, <4  11.1     6.8  8.6  9.0  11.9  6.1  8.1  20.4  21.4 
Provision of skills, 4-6  9.5  6.8     6.1  8.3  11.0  7.3  5.4  21.8  22.0 
Provision of skills, 7-12  11.6  8.6  6.1     10.6  11.7  10.3  7.5  20.2  20.9 
Practice firm, 4-6  12.3  9.0  8.3  10.6     13.4  9.9  9.1  19.6  21.4 
Retraining, >12  12.5  11.9  11.0  11.7  13.4     12.7  11.5  17.6  17.8 
Short training in firm  9.7  6.1  7.3  10.3  9.9  12.7     7.9  22.2  22.6 
Short training in class  8.3  8.1  5.4  7.5  9.1  11.5  7.9     21.2  21.3 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  19.0  20.4  21.8  20.2  19.6  17.6  22.2  21.2     7.6 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  19.1  21.4  22.0  20.9  21.4  17.8  22.6  21.3  7.6    
2 Mean standardised bias after matching 
2.1 Neighest neighbour matching without replacement 
Provision of skills, <4  3.0     1.4  1.9  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.4  3.2  2.6 
Provision of skills, 4-6  1.9  1.7     1.4  3.3  2.2  1.3  1.7  2.7  3.4 
Provision of skills, 7-12  2.1  1.3  1.4     3.3  2.0  1.1  1.5  2.5  2.2 
Practice firm, 4-6  3.4  2.7  2.2  3.4     3.9  2.8  3.3  5.1  4.9 
Retraining, >12  2.2  2.5  2.1  1.7  4.3     2.3  2.0  3.9  3.1 
Short training in firm  1.8  2.3  1.5  1.3  3.0  2.5     1.0  3.4  3.6 
Short training in class  1.5  3.0  2.2  1.4  4.0  2.5  1.2     2.7  2.7 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  2.2  3.1  3.2  2.7  5.3  4.2  2.7  2.2     1.6 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  1.9  3.4  2.9  2.4  4.0  3.7  3.1  2.9  1.6    
2.2 Radius matching 
Provision of skills, <4  0.4     1.0  1.2  2.8  3.7  0.8  0.8  6.6  5.5 
Provision of skills, 4-6  0.3  1.3     0.9  2.2  2.3  0.9  0.4  9.8  8.9 
Provision of skills, 7-12  0.5  1.5  1.2     3.6  2.7  1.4  0.7  8.5  6.8 
Practice firm, 4-6  0.6  3.1  1.3  2.2     4.6  1.3  0.7  8.0  5.4 
Retraining, >12  0.4  2.3  1.5  1.7  3.6     1.5  0.9  6.7  5.4 
Short training in firm  0.2  1.3  1.2  1.4  3.4  3.4     0.6  9.1  7.0 
Short training in class  0.2  2.5  1.1  1.4  3.5  2.5  0.9     10.1  6.6 
Job creation scheme, 4-6  1.7  7.8  6.1  4.0  7.6  7.9  3.8  2.9     2.4 
Job creation scheme, 7-12  1.0  6.4  6.6  3.4  8.3  6.6  3.8  2.4  1.6    
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  